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NOTES
RULE 11: CONFLICTING APPELLATE STANDARDS OF
REVIEW AND A PROPOSED UNIFORM APPROACH
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 defines the boundaries of
acceptable litigation behavior in the federal courts by empowering
courts to sanction attorneys or their clients for abuse of the litigation process.1 Since its amendment in 1983, Rule 11 has been the
focus of a large amount of academic commentary2 and the source of
much activity in the federal courts. 3 As Judge Schwarzer commented, "Rule 11 has become a significant factor in civil litigation,
with an impact that has likely exceeded its drafters' expectations."-4
Criticisms of the Rule 11 regime are many. Commentators argue that it chills doctrine-challenging advocacy,5 undermines its
As amended in 1983 and 1987, Rule 11 provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or
other paper and state the party's address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best
of the signer's knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper
is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 [hereinafter "Rule 11" or "the Rule"].
2
See infra sources cited in notes 3-11.
3
Rule 11 has produced over 1,000 cases since being amended in 1983. Gregory
P. Joseph, The Trouble with Rule 11, 73 A.B.A.J. 87, 88 (1987).
4 William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (1988).
5 Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313, 1338
(1986).
I
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own purpose of streamlining federal court litigation 6 by generating
satellite litigation, 7 conflicts with the Federal Rules' liberal pleading
policies, 8 is imposed disproportionately on certain types of litigants, 9 and is applied inconsistently.1 0
In light of these criticisms, defining the circuit courts' role in
"striking a proper balance and enforcing Rule 11 is of extreme importance."'' I The courts of appeals, however, have not taken a uniform approach in resolving Rule 11 cases, but have instead
developed three different approaches. 12 Appellate court disagreement centers on the reviewing court's level of involvement in deciding Rule 11 issues. Some courts argue that the Rule 11
determination is best made by the trial judge, and the appellate
court should conduct only limited review.1 3 Other courts take a
more hands-on approach, engaging in broad review of Rule 11
14
decisions.
This Note analyzes appellate review of Rule 11 cases and proposes an alternative approach for courts of appeals that would combat the problems that have developed in Rule 11 jurisprudence.
Part I briefly outlines the history of Rule 11 and its 1983 amendments. Part II describes the three approaches courts of appeals
have taken in reviewing Rule 11 decisions. Part III discusses the
potential chilling effects of overbroad and inconsistent application
of Rule 11. Part IV analyzes the appellate approaches on an issue by
issue basis in light of the problem of inconsistent and overbroad
application of Rule 11 and argues that appellate courts should do all
6

FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198

(1983) [hereinafter Advisory Note] ("Greater attention .. .to pleading and motion
abuses ... should ... help to streamline the litigation process.").
7 ABA COMM. ON FEDERAL PROCEDURE, SANCTIONS: RULE 1 1 AND OTHER POWERS

15-16 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter ABA SANCTIONS] ("[An analysis of recent circuit court
authority... reveals that Rule I1 has caused unnecessary satellite litigation."). Satellite
litigation is litigation, ancillary to the main case, over the applicability of sanctions.
8
Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standardsfor Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 632 (1987) ("[C]ourts have applied amended Rule I1 too broadly as a tool for
docket management and ... have thus, in many cases, undermined the value of open
access to court embodied in the liberal pleading regime of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.").
9 Arthur B. LaFrance, FederalRule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U.L. REV.
331, 353 (1988) ("Although civil rights cases constitute less than 8% of case filing in
federal court, they amounted to more than 22%o of reported Rule 11 cases between 1983
and 1985.") (emphasis in original).
10 Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 1015.
11 Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 226 (1988).
12
See infra Part II for a discussion of the appellate courts' differing approaches.
13 See infra Part HI(A). Those courts deferring to the trial court's judgment in
Rule 11 cases do so because they view the analysis as a fact-intensive inquiry.
14
See infra Part II(B) and (C). Those courts engaging in broad review of Rule 11
decisions do so because they see themselves as being in as good a position as the trial
court to make these judgments.
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they can to promote uniformity and adherence to the policies of the
Federal Rules in Rule 11 cases. Finally, Part IV posits an approach
to appellate review that is consistent with these interests.
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Original Version of Rule 11

Under the original version of Rule 11,15 promulgated in 1938
and unchanged until its amendment in 1983,16 an attorney's signature on a pleading certified that there was "good ground to support
it; and that it [was] not interposed for delay."' 7 Courts applied the
"good ground to support" requirement to both the factual and legal
bases of the pleading.' 8 The original Rule imposed a "moral obligation" on lawyers not to file baseless pleadings, 19 and was intended
"to secure lawyer honesty." 20 The original Rule gave courts two
powers: (1) to strike a pleading as sham and false, and (2) to discretionarily impose disciplinary action upon an attorney who willfully
1
violated the rule.2
Original Rule 11 was ineffective in deterring abuses. 22 Despite
15

The original version of Rule II provided:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed
by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there
is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay. If a
pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of
this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed
as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this
rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action.
Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938) (amended 1983, 1987) [hereinafter Original Rule].
16 Nelken, supra note 5, at 1314. Rule II also was amended in 1987. This amendment was not substantive.
17 Original Rule, supra note 15.
18 See, e.g., Heart Disease Research Found. v. General Motors Corp., 15 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1517, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("Rule 11 casts an affirmative obligation upon counsel who signs a pleading to represent his honest belief that there are facts
and law to support the claims asserted in his pleading.").
19 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1333, at 499 (1969).
20
D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking"
Problems with FederalRule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1976).
21 ld
22 Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 198.
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the original Rule's intention of securing lawyer honesty, courts did
not strike pleadings as sham absent a determination of both the
pleader's bad faith dishonesty and the pleading's falsity. 23 Paradoxically, although the language of the original Rule seemed to address
24
lawyers' conduct, courts more frequently sanctioned the client.
To enforce the original Rule against a lawyer, courts had to find that
the attorney willfully violated it, and, even then, "appropriate disciplinary action" was discretionary. 2 5 Courts often interpreted the
willful violation standard as requiring a showing of subjective bad
26
faith, making enforcement against lawyers even more difficult.
Courts rarely applied the original Rule. 27 Commentators suggest several reasons for this. The good faith defense sheltered lawyers from "all but the most egregiously frivolous suits." 2 8 The
Rule's "meaningless sanctions" also added to courts' infrequent application of the original Rule. 29 One commentator has postulated,
however, "that it was less the rule's language than prevalent ideas
about the propriety of sanctions against lawyers that caused it to be
30
ignored for so long."
B.

The 1983 Version of Rule 11
1. Reasons for Amendment

In 1983, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee amended
31
Rule 11 as part of an "integrated package" of rules amendments.
23 Id. at 16.
24 Nelken, supra note 5, at 1315. Pleadings, if signed with "intent to defeat the
purpose of the rule," could be stricken as sham. See Original Rule, supra note 15. Thus
the client would be penalized for the attorney's misconduct.
25 Nelken, supra note 5, at 1315.
26 See, e.g., Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire, 717 F.2d 1160, 1167 (7th Cir. 1983)
(Rule 11 sanctions denied because of "lack of any showing of subjective bad faith");
Nemeroffv. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The standard under Rule 11
...is bad faith.").
27 See Risinger, supra note 20, at 34-35 (finding only 19 "genuine adversary Rule 11
motions" between 1938 and 1976); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 19, §§ 133234, at 496 (1983 Supp.) (finding 40 Rule I1 cases between 1975 and 1983). For information on Rule 11 activity since 1983, see supra note 3.
28 See Note, The Intended Application of FederalRule of Civil Procedure 11: An End to the
"Empty Head, Pure Heart" Defense and a Reinforcement of Ethical Standards, 41 VAND. L. REV.
343, 352 (1982) (authored by Robbie A. Wilson).
29 Arthur R. Miller & Diana G. Culp, Litigation Costs: Delay Prompted the New Rules of
Civil Procedure, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 28, 1983, at 34, col. 1.
30 Nelken, supra note 5, at 1316.
31

ARTHUR MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILrry (Federal Judicial Center 1984). Other Rules amended in 1983 include Rule 7
("[a]mended to make explicit that the certification requirement and sanctions provisions
of Rule 11 are applicable to motions and other papers"), Rule 16 ("[a]mended Rule 16
is intended to bring about greater judicial control of civil cases from their earliest
stages"), and Rule 26 ("[a]mended Rule 26 addresses the problem of excessive or abu-
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The Committee designed the amendments to "remedy the perceived inefficiencies and abuses of the system by increasing judicial
oversight of litigation and by diminishing the incentives for certain
kinds of litigation behavior through sanctions provisions." 3 2 Specifically, Rule 11 was amended to meet the legal community's concerns
over "frivolous litigation,"3 3 a "mounting federal caseload,"'3 4 and
"the loss of public confidence caused by lawyers' using the courts
for their own ends rather than with a consideration of the public
interest." 3 5 The legal community believed it necessary to increase
the use of sanctions to deal with these problems,3 6 and considered
37
the original Rule ineffective in deterring abuses.
2.

The Amended Rule 11

3
The Advisory Committee made major changes to Rule 11. 8

sive discovery"). William L. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New FederalRule 11-A Closer
Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 183 (1985).
32
Nelken, supra note 5, at 1317.
33
See Coburn Optical Indus., Inc. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 658, n.4
(M.D.N.C. 1985).
34 See Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. No. 8, 802
F.2d 247, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1986).
35 Address by ChiefJustice Warren Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-Needfor Systematic
Anticipation, National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJustice (April 7-9, 1976) (Conference commemorating Roscoe Pound's
address to the American Bar Association 1906 annual meeting), reprintedin 70 F.R.D. 83,
91 (1976).
36 Dreis, 802 F.2d at 255-56 ("[Ilt [is] imperative that the federal courts impose
sanctions on persons and firms that abuse their right of access to these courts ....
Lawyers practicing in the Seventh Circuit, take heed!").
37 Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 198.
38 Id. The italicized portions below indicate additions to the original Rule 11; the
language in parenthesis has been deleted from the original Rule.
Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented
by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion or other paper and state his
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute,
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in
equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by
the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney orparty constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other
paper that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief (there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay)formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded infact and is warrantedby existing law
or a goodfaith argumentfor the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
and that it is not interposedfor any improperpurpose such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increasein the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion
or otherpaper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signedpromptly after the
omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant (or it is signed with
intent to defeat the purpose of the rule; it may be stricken as sham and
false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been
served. For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
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First, the amended version is more specific than the original Rule
and expands the scope of sanctionable conduct.3 9 While the original Rule required that the attorney believe good grounds existed to
support the pleading, 40 the amended Rule requires the attorney to
actually make a reasonable inquiry into fact and law. 4 1 Courts have

interpreted Rule 11 as requiring that attorneys' conduct meet an
objective standard. 4 2 The Advisory Committee also deleted the
willful mental state requirement in the amended Rule. 43 Finally, the

Advisory Committee withdrew trial judge discretion in imposing
sanctions: once the court finds a violation of the Rule, it must im44
pose a sanction.
Attorneys comply with Rule 11 as long as the paper they sign
satisfies the affirmative duties imposed by the Rule's three prongs. 4 5
To satisfy the "well grounded in fact" requirement, an attorney
must conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts, and may not simply rely on his client's representations if further investigation is reasonable. 46 A claim satisfies the "warranted by law" requirement if it
appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous
or indecent matter is inserted.) If a pleading, motion, or otherpaper is signed
in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a representedparty, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the otherparty orparties the amount
of the reasonablecpenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney'sfee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 196-97 (1983).
39
The scope of sanctionable conduct is expanded in that the amendments recognize improper conduct other than delay. Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 198. The
amended Rule is more specific in that the "good ground to support" requirement was
rewritten to include both factual and legal grounds. Id.
40 Original Rule, supra note 15. Courts interpreted the original Rule to allow for a
subjective good faith defense. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
41 Rule 11, supra note 1.
42 See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987) ("Rule I1 as
amended incorporates an objective standard"); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New
York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d cir. 1985) ("[A] showing of subjective bad faith is no
longer required to trigger the sanctions imposed by the rule."); Zaldivar v. City of Los
Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[S]ubjective bad faith is not an element to
be proved under present Rule 1 ."). This interpretation is consistent with that of the
Advisory Committee. Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 198 ("The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances.").
43 Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 200.
44 Rule 11, supra note I ("the court... shall impose.., an appropriate sanction")
(emphasis added). Under the original Rule, courts had discretion as to whether to impose a sanction for a violation. Original Rule, supra note 15.
45
Judge Schwarzer states that there are "three substantive prongs of [Rule I 1]: its
factual basis, its legal basis, and its legitimate purpose." Schwarzer, supra note 31, at
186.
46 See, e.g., Coburn Optical Indus., Inc. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 659
(M.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that an attorney is sanctionable if he relies on his clients'
assurance that facts exist or do not exist when a reasonable inquiry would reveal otherwise); Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (if attorney has a
document refuting client's allegations, he must investigate).
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provides "a colorable basis for relief." 4 7 What constitutes a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law depends on the circumstances in
which the attorney signed the paper. 48 Finally, courts determine
whether a party or attorney signed a paper with an improper pur49
pose under an objective standard.
The Advisory Committee's stated purpose in amending Rule 11
was "to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions." 50
Studies indicate that this purpose has been achieved, 5 1 but as courts
more frequently have resorted to Rule 11, new problems have
arisen. Anticipating these developments, the Committee expressed
concerns that Rule 11 might chill creative advocacy, 52 that the efficiency gained by the amendments would be "offset by the cost of
satellite litigation," 53 and that courts would not comply with due
54
process requirements.
3.

The Amended Rule and Appellate Courts

Rule 11 does not set forth a specific standard of review. 55 The
Advisory Committee Notes provide only limited guidance, commenting that trial courts have "discretion to tailor sanctions to the
particular facts of the case."' 56 The Notes remain silent as to the
degree of deference appellate courts should afford trial courts regarding other Rule 11 issues. 5 7 Consequently, there is no consensus among the courts of appeals regarding the standard of review to
be used in Rule 11 cases. Some courts adhere to the 'same standard
of review they employed under the original Rule, 5 8 while others interpret the changes to require a new standard. 59
/

Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988).
48
Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 199.
49
See Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds. of the United States, 830 F.2d
1429, 1436 (7th Cir. 1987); Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir.
1987).
50 Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 198.
See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 3, and Vairo, supra note 11. There have been over
51
1,000 Rule 11 cases since its amendment in 1983. There were fewer than 60 Rule 11
cases in the period from its promulgation in 1938 through 1983. See, e.g., Risinger, supra
note 20, at 35; 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 19, §§ 1332-34 (1983 Supp.).
52 Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 199. ("The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories.").
47

53

Id at 201.

54

Id.

55
56

FED.

57
58

59

R. Civ. P. 11 (1987). This also is true of the Original Rule, supra note 15.
Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 200.
Id.
E.g., Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986).
E.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987).
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II
APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The courts of appeals have not developed a uniform approach
to reviewing district court Rule 11 decisions. Instead, they have formulated and employed three distinct standards. Eight circuits have
used an abuse of discretion standard, 60 merely inquiring whether
the district court abused its discretion as to all issues decided in a
Rule 11 case. Two circuits have applied a three-tiered standard of
review, 6 1 investigating each of the district court's factual, legal, and
sanction findings according to different standards. Finally, three circuits have applied a variation on the three-tiered approach, 62 varying the degree of scrutiny on review based on the Rule 1 1 decision
below.
A.

Abuse of Discretion

The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Federal Circuits have employed an abuse of discretion standard of review for Rule 11 decisions. 6 3 Under this standard, the court of
appeals grants the district court wide leeway in its determination of
all issues decided in a Rule 11 case. The Fifth Circuit adopted this
standard in the well-reasoned opinion in Thomas v. Capital Security
Services, Inc.6 4 Sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit reconciled two lines
of cases, one employing an abuse of discretion standard, 65 and the
other a more demanding three-tiered analysis. 6 6 The court stated
that "we believe application of an abuse of discretion standard
60
Courts employing an abuse of discretion standard include the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Federal Circuits. See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v.
Continental Bank, N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1989); Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc.,
875 F.2d 300, 304 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 154 (1989); Herron v.Jupiter

Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 1988); Introcaso v. Cunningham, 857 F.2d 965,
969 (4th Cir. 1988); Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191,
195 (3d Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 872 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc); EBI, Inc. v. Gator Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 1, 6 (Ist Cir. 1986); Cotner v.
Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1986).
61 Courts employing the three-tiered analysis include the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 203 n.8 (8th Cir. 1987); Zaldivar v.
City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986). But see O'Connell v. Champion
Int'l Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987) (employing abuse of discretion standard).
62 Courts employing the variation analysis include the D.C., Second, and Eleventh
Circuits. See, e.g., Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1556; Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d
1168, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d
243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985). But see Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24,
32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (employing abuse of discretion standard), cert. denied 485 U.S. 961
(1988).
63

See, e.g., cases cited supra note 60.

64
65

836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
E.g., Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985)
E.g., Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987).

66

NOTE-RULE 11 SANCTIONS

1990]

735

across the board to all issues in Rule 11 cases is the better
67
approach."
In Thomas, the plaintiffs-employees filed suit against Capital, the
defendant-employer, alleging racial and sexual discrimination. 68
The court found for defendant on the merits, and the defendant
then moved for Rule 11 sanctions. 6 9 The district judge denied the
motion because of the unsettled nature of the law involved in the
case, 70 but noted that plaintiffs' " 'shotgun' allegations.., appear to
have been taken from a litigation form book.... [And] the court is
not totally convinced that a reasonable prefiling inquiry as to the
specific law and facts was made ... ."71 On appeal, a Fifth Circuit
panel followed Robinson v. National Cash Register Co. 72 by applying a
de novo standard of review in reversing the denial of Rule 11
73
sanctions.
The Fifth Circuit then reheard the case en banc and rejected
Robinson, adopting an abuse of discretion standard in the light of the
"fact-intensive inquiry" necessary to determine whether courts
should impose a sanction. 74 Because "[t]he trial judge is in the best
position to review the factual circumstances and render an informed
judgment as he is intimately involved with the case.., on a daily
basis," the court decided that "no advantage would result if this
Court were to conduct a second hand review of the facts .. .
Moreover, district courts are more familiar with what constitutes
"acceptable trial-level practice ...."76 The court also relied on an
American Bar Association publication which argued that, although
those courts employing de novo review do so in an attempt to promote uniformity, "the goal of uniformity may be no better served by
the de novo standard [than by the abuse of discretion standard] be77
cause many sanctions cases are fact-intensive, close calls."1
B.

Three-Tiered Analysis

The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have employed a three-tiered
analysis for appellate review of Rule 11 decisions. The appellate
court first uses a "clearly erroneous" standard to review the facts
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Thomas, 836 F.2d at 872.
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 110 F.R.D. 402, 403 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
Id. at 402.

Id. at 403.
Id.
808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987).
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 812 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing ABA SANCTIONS, supra note 7, at 28-29).
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upon which the district court relied to establish whether a paper violated Rule 11. It then applies de novo review to the district court's
legal decisions as to whether the paper was "well grounded in fact,"
"warranted by law," or interposed for an improper purpose. 78 Finally, the appellate court uses an abuse of discretion standard to
review the appropriateness of the sanction the district court
79
imposed.
Neither of the circuits utilizing this approach gives substantive
reasons for its adoption. In Zaldivarv. City of Los Angeles,8 0 the Ninth
Circuit adopted the three-tiered approach "to maintain consistency
with [its] law in similar situations." 8 1 The Eighth Circuit merely
cited and quoted Zaldivarin a footnote in Kurkowski v. Volcker.8 2 Reasons for using this standard are fleshed out more fully in Robinson, 3
the Fifth Circuit case rejected by Thomas.8 4 The Robinson court addressed the conflict between an appellate court's deference to the
district court (given the district court's superior position gained by
observing the litigation), and Rule lI's requirement that, once a violation is found, a sanction must be imposed.8 5 To support its adoption of the more stringent three-tiered analysis, the court relied on
Judge Friendly's admonition that "abuse of discretion" is an inexact
86
term that allows for varying degrees of scrutiny.
C.

Variation on the Three-Tiered Analysis

The D.C., Second, and Eleventh Circuits employ a variation on
the three-tiered analysis in reviewing Rule 11 decisions.8 7 Under
this analysis, the district court has wide discretion in determining
whether a paper is "well grounded in fact" or filed for an improper
purpose.8 8 The district court, having conducted the litigation, is in
the best position to make these factual determinations. The appel78
See, e.g., Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 203 (8th Cir. 1987); Zaldivar v. City
of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986). But see O'Connell v. Champion Int'l
Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987) (employing abuse of discretion standard).
79 Kurkowski, 819 F.2d at 203 n.8; Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 828.
80 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
81
Id. at 828 n.4.
82 819 F.2d 201, 203 n.8 (8th Cir. 1987).
83 Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987).
84 For a discussion of Thomas, see supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
85 Robinson, 808 F.2d at 1126 n.12.
86 Id. (citing Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion about Discretion, 31 EmoRY L.J. 747, 763
(1982)).
87 See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Eastway Constr. Corp. v.
City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985). But see Adams v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (employing abuse of discretion
standard).
88 Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1174.
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late court conducts de
novo review if the issue is whether a paper is
"warranted by law." 8 9 De novo review is warranted because the
courts consider this issue to be a question of law. Once the district
court finds factual insufficiency, legal insufficiency, or an improper
purpose, "Rule 11 requires that sanctions... be imposed," 90 and a
district court's failure to impose sanctions "constitutes error" under
this analysis. 9 1 The appellate court reviews the district court's selection of the type of sanction imposed under an abuse of discretion
92
standard.
III
RULE

1 'S

POTENTIAL CHILLING EFFECT

Courts may create a chilling effect on doctrine-challenging litigation by applying Rule 11 overbroadly or inconsistently. The Advisory Committee was aware of this potential problem when drafting
in 1983 amendments to Rule 11. 9 3 Its interpretation of Rule 11
conforms to the Federal Rules' liberal pleading policies. 94 The Advisory Committee's goal in amending Rule 11 was to curb litigation
abuse, not to chill creative advocacy or to eliminate dynamism in the
law. 9 5 Despite the Advisory Committee's intentions, decisions interpreting Rule 11 are setting the stage for a chilling effect.
A.

Overbroad Application of Rule 11

Attorneys may be reluctant to try factually underdeveloped or
legally novel cases if courts interpret Rule 11 overbroadly. An overbroad interpretation of Rule 11 conflicts with the liberal pleading
policies of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, thus sanctioning
89
90
91

Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1174-75.
Id. at 1175.

92

Id.

93 Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 199 ("The Rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories.").
94 The Federal Rules were designed to de-emphasize pleadings as a screening device and to encourage discovery as a means to "get to the merits of the case." Richard
L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,86 COLUM.
L. REV. 433, 440 (1986). As the Supreme Court stated, "[a] complaint should not be

dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (citations omitted). The Federal Rules thus sought to
eliminate the emphasis on pleading practice that existed prior to their enactment. Marcus, supra, at 437-40. The Rules also sought to facilitate positive challenges to and
changes in existing doctrine. See Note, supra note 8, at 646. By allowing for "good faith
argument[s] for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law," Rule 11 acknowledges and encourages the dynamism of legal doctrine. Rule 11, supra note I.
95 Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 199.
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otherwise permissible claims. 96 The Federal Rules are designed to
facilitate novel claims by permitting factual development after the
pleading stage 97 and by not requiring reliance on established legal
doctrine. 98 If courts read Rule 11 to require extensive factual development at the pleading stage, 99 or narrowly construe the "warranted by law" requirement, 0 0 they undermine the liberal pleading
regime. Such a reading of Rule 11 forces attorneys to eschew claims
where the facts can be ascertained only through discovery' 01 and
10 2
claims that rely novel legal theories.
B.

Inconsistent Application of Rule 11

Courts also may create a chilling effect by applying Rule 11 inconsistently. Because Rule 11 provides little guidance and because
most courts of appeals conduct only limited review of district court
Rule 11 decisions, 10 3 district court judges have been left to fashion
their own standards of sanctionable conduct. Hence, judges do not
96 See supra note 94 for a description of the liberal pleading policies of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
97 The Federal Rules allow a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss unless "it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (citations omitted).
98 Courts cannot sanction an attorney if his complaint relies on a good faith argument for a change in established legal doctrine. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Additionally, an
attorney need not have settled on a legal theory in his complaint. See FED. R. Civ. P.
8(e)(2) (permitting a litigant to plead alternate claims).
99 See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 205-06 n.8 (7th
Cir. 1985), aff'g 596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. 11. 1984) ("[H]ad plaintiff introduced.., some
fact to prove that the city maintained the policies... allege[d] then he would have stated
an actionable claim."); Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1172-73 (N.D. Cal.
1985) (imposing sanctions on lawyer for relying on client's statements rather than conducting prediscovery inquiry at the S.E.C., the U.S. Attorney's Office, and a storage
company).
100 See, e.g., Rodgers, 596 F. Supp. at 16-17 (sanctioning plaintiff's attorneys because
plaintiff's claims had "no arguable basis in existing law").
101 Fifty-five percent of reported Rule 11 decisions are public interest cases (e.g.,
civil rights and employment discrimination claims), antitrust, RICO, or securities claims.
Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding ProfessionalResponsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 323 n.175 (1986) (authored by Neal H. Klansner).
Professor LaFrance asserts that these cases are "uniquely targeted by Rule 11 because
their facts cannot be adequately developed until after suit .... " LaFrance, supra note 9,
at 353. For example, gender-based discrimination cases often must be proven by facts
ascertained from a defendant's file after suit has been initiated. Edward D. Cavanaugh,
Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HoFSTRA L. REV. 499, 517-18 (1986).
102
Public interest cases fit this model. They often contain issues that are "grounded
on unclear, yet fundamental concepts which challenge.., decades of custom entrenched
in legal protections." LaFrance, supra note 9, at 336.
103
See supra Part II(A) for a description of the analysis used by those courts which
defer to the district court's Rule I1 decision.
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apply Rule 11 consistently, 10 4 as a Federal Judiciary Center study
documents.1 0 5 For example, in one hypothetical case, almost half of
the judges polled would have sanctioned a paper that the remaining
judges found permissible.1 0 6 Judges' conflicting notions of what behavior is sanctionable have resulted in a trial court sanctioning an
attorney only to see the appellate court remove the Rule 11 sanction
and reverse on the merits. 10 7 In such an uncertain atmosphere, an
attorney may perceive himself as vulnerable to sanction and might
be reluctant to make borderline arguments. He may be unsure how
broadly a judge will read Rule 11 or, worse still, he may know that a
judge typically reads Rule 11 broadly and that his chances of being
sanctioned are high. Judge Schwarzer recognized this problem
when he noted that "judges may also be chary about criticizing a
lawyer's conduct out of concern that they are or will be perceived as
imposing their personal standards of professionalism on others."' 10 8
Unfortunately, that may be what judges are doing.
A more troubling aspect of the problem of courts' inconsistent
application of Rule 11 is that courts sanction certain types of litigants more frequently than others. Studies show that Rule 11 sanctions are disproportionately imposed upon civil rights plaintiffs. 10 9
These cases advance precisely the sort of doctrinal challenges that
the drafters of the Federal Rules sought to encourage and facilitate.1 10 It is reasonable to expect that fear of sanction and the pecuniary risk that civil rights attorneys must take 1 1 will accomplish that
which the Advisory Committee hoped Rule 11 would not: the chilling of creative, doctrine-challenging advocacy.
The heightened risk of sanction on an innovative case or the
uncertainty of what a judge may find sanctionable will influence an
attorney's conduct. Some lawyers and clients may be able to absorb
the threat as a cost of litigation, 1 2 but many others, especially
See Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 1015 ("In interpreting and applying Rule 11, the
courts have become a veritable Tower of Babel.").
105 See SAUL H. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS (1985).
106 See id. at 17 (table 3).
107 See Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985), vacating 580 F. Supp. 1373
(W.D.N.Y. 1984) (district court's grant of motion to dismiss and imposition of Rule 11
sanction).
108 Schwarzer, supra note 31, at 184.
109 See, e.g., LaFrance, supra note 9, at 353; Nelken, supra note 5,at 1354-69; Vairo,
supra note 11, at 200.
110 For an analysis of the role of public interest litigation in the American legal system and its relation to Rule 11, see LaFrance, supra note 9.
111 Civil rights clients often "do not have the resources or access of great corporations or governmental agencies .... LaFrance, supra note 9, at 353. Their attorneys
thus tend to rely on statutory fees, see id. at 338-39, which makes the attorneys particularly vulnerable to financial hardship.
112 See Note, A Uniorm Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L. J.901, 914 (1988)
104
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poorly-financed public interest lawyers, will be reluctant to take certain cases or make certain arguments. Their "enthusiasm or creativ113
ity in pursuing factual or legal theories" will be chilled.
IV
THE ROLE OF THE APPELLATE COURTS

The courts of appeals should play a role in preventing overbroad and inconsistent application of Rule 11 and the ills caused
thereby. Appellate review, although not a constitutional obligation,
is a highly valued aspect of the American judicial process." t4 This
may be a function of the view that "an appellatejudge is inherently
more able than a trial judge, '" 115 but it is more likely a result of the
idea that "unreviewable discretion offends a deep sense of fitness in
our view of the administration ofjustice."116 Whatever the reasons
for this preference, "broad judicial review is necessary to preserve
the most basic principle of jurisprudence that 'we must act alike in
all cases of like nature.' "117 In Rule 11 jurisprudence, this tenet
suggests a need to promote the uniformity that is lacking in district
court sanction decisions. Is The courts of appeals can help ameliorate this problem by providing guidelines where appellate scrutiny
will reap benefits, and deferring to the district court in other circumstances. 1 9 An appellate court can combat uncertainty by exercising
its "power to declare the law and thus to impose on the trial level
decision maker general rules affecting all cases that come within the
(authored by Alan E. Untereiner) (Defense counsel representing wealthy individuals or
corporations might "agree to risk Rule 11 sanctions, for example, in order to delay a
judgement.").
113 Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 199. Judge Schwarzer argues that the threat of
sanctions, which he concedes could inhibit attorneys, will not chill vigorous advocacy.
Schwarzer, supra note 31, at 184. His premise, that attorneys will only be sanctioned for
illegitimate litigation tactics, id., is undermined by studies demonstrating Rule I l's inconsistent application and disparate impact on public interest attorneys.
114 See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 641-42 (1971).
115 Friendly, supra note 86, at 757. Judge Friendly did not espouse this view. See
infra note 126 and accompanying text for a description ofJudge Friendly's views on this
issue.
116 Rosenberg, supra note 114, at 641-42.
117 Friendly, supra note 86, at 757-58 (quoting Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273,
294, (C.A.) (quoting Lord Mansfield in John Wilkes' case, Rex v. Wilkes, 96 Eng. Rep.
327, 335 (1770))).
118 See S. KASSIN, supra note 105, at 29-32. Judges take three different views of
Rule I l's purpose: deterrence, compensation and punishment. In hypothetical situations, those who viewed compensation as the Rule's primary purpose imposed sanctions
most frequently. Those who viewed the purpose as deterrence imposed sanctions somewhat less frequently. And those who considered punishment the Rule's primary purpose imposed sanctions least often.
119 See infra Part IV(A) for an analysis of the standards appellate courts should adopt
in reviewing Rule 11 decisions.
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rules' terms."' 2 0 Once attorneys and their clients know where the
lines delineating acceptable litigation tactics are drawn, they will be
freed from the chilling effects of subjective or inconsistent application of Rule 11. An example of this approach can be found in
Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York.' 2 ' The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's imposition of sanctions for legal insufficiency and formulated a generally applicable rule. The court stated
that "where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of
success under the existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend, modify, or reverse the law as it
stands, Rule 11 has been violated."' 2 2 Such a standard clearly indicates to litigants the limits to which they can push the legal sufficiency requirement and removes much of the uncertainty that exists
in the absence of such a pronouncement.
While a more uniform approach offers benefits, it does not,
standing alone, cure all ills. Appellate courts should not only offer
guidance in order to effectuate Rule lI's policies, they should do so
in such a way so as to avoid conflict with the Federal Rules' liberal
pleading policies. There is no easy formula for accomplishing this
task. The American system ofjudicial administration is "committed
to the practice of affording a two-tiered or three-tiered court system,
so that a losing litigant may obtain at least one chance for review of
each significant ruling made at the trial court level."' 123 We believe
that appellate review is crucial to achievingjustice. Hence, appellate
courts typically review questions of law independently. 1 24 "[L]aw
declaration is the special province of the appellate level."' 125 This
allocation of responsibility must be based on the conclusion that the
appellate court, for whatever reason, 126 is more likely to make a cor120 Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial
and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C.L. REv. 993, 1017 (1986). Professor Louis defined the appellate

function as "establish[ing] the relevant definitions and limits through the exercise of
lawmaking power .... " Id. He subdivides this appellate lawmaking power into three
subsidiary powers: the "law declaration power," whereby appellate courts make general
rules; the "supervisory power," whereby appellate courts can rule that particular triallevel findings are abuses of discretion; and the "classification power," whereby appellate
courts can dictate the standard of review of a trial level decision by calling it a question
of law, which requires de novo review. Id. It is the law declaration power that is most
crucial to appellate court promotion of uniformity because, through its excercise, reviewing courts limit the lawmaking power of trial courts, thus imposing one rule on
every court within the circuit.
121 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
122 Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
123 Rosenberg, supra note 114, at 642.
124
Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1115, 1128 (1987).

125

Louis, supra note 120, at 994.

126

See Friendly, supra note 86, at 757-58. Judge Friendly states that "[t]he advan-
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rect decision. Thus, where they promote uniformity by formulating
generally applicable rules, appellate courts also are expected to formulate the correct rule. It is on this likelihood that the litigant must
place his hope that courts will interpret Rule 11 so as to avoid a
chilling effect.
A.

A Critical Analysis of Present Standards of Review and a
Proposed Alternative

In this section, this Note analyzes the courts of appeals' approaches to appellate review in the light of Rule lI's potential chilling effects and the role of appellate courts. The analysis is
conducted on an issue by issue basis because of the different inquiries necessary under Rule 11. It concludes that the courts of appeals
should review Rule 11 cases under varying standards, depending
upon the issues on appeal: where the issue on appeal is whether a
paper is "well grounded in fact" or "warranted by law," the appellate court should conduct de novo review; if the issue is whether the
attorney had an improper purpose in filing the paper, the appellate
court should defer to the district court; an appellate court should
review the district court's choice of sanction under an abuse of discretion standard; and the appellate court should use a clearly erroneous standard to review the facts upon which the trial court relied.
1.

"Warranted by Law" Cases

Under Rule 11, ajudge must impose a sanction if an attorney or
pro se litigant submits a paper that is not "warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law .... ," 12 7 Arguably, this requirement poses the greatest potential for conflict with liberal pleading policies and the greatest threat of a chilling effect. Litigation that challenges established
legal doctrine often involves issues which are "grounded on unclear, yet fundamental concepts which [challenge] decades of custom entrenched in legal protections."'' 2 Rule 11 requires trial
judges to distinguish between claims that are "so implausible that
29
the lawyer must refrain from filing in order to avoid sanctions"'
and good faith arguments for change in the law. Because Rule 11
provides little guidance in making this determination, judges have
tages of the appellate tribunal lie not in the personal qualities of its members but elsewhere." Id. at 757. These advantages are: the lesser time constraints appellate courts
enjoy; the existence of counsel who have had more time to prepare their cases; issue
refinement by the trial court; appellate court judges' combined greater experience in the
subject matter of the case; and the benefits of being a collegial body. Id.
127

FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1987).

128

LaFrance, supra note 9,at 336.

129

Note, supra note 8, at 638.
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"depended on their own individual notions of good legal arguments,"' 30 and doctrine-challenging cases have been dis3
proportionately sanctioned.' '
The courts of appeals employ two standards in reviewing "warranted by law" cases.' 32 Some courts apply an abuse of discretion
standard, and the remaining courts review legal sufficiency cases de
33
novo. 1
a. Abuse of Discretion Review Is Ineffective in Combatting
Rule 11 'sChilling Effect in "Warranted by Law" Cases
The abuse of discretion standard is less restrictive than the de
novo standard, granting wide deference to district court decisions.
Its effectiveness as a means of promoting uniformity in Rule 11 jurisprudence is debatable. Studies indicate that a judge's decision to
impose a Rule 11 sanction is highly subjective. 13 4 Because the legal
sufficiency clause requires judges to determine the legal plausibility
of claims, this subjectivity may give rise to different standards
among judges. Without guidance from above, these differing standards will remain; judicial fiefdoms will arise, each employing its
own rules. By reviewing a trial court's highly individualized legal
sufficiency decision under an abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court is more likely to obstruct than to promote uniformity. Because such relaxed review leaves lawmaking power with the district
judge, it is hardly surprising that these judges have developed different standards.' 35 The appellate courts fail to play their role in administering Rule 11 by failing to reconcile these inconsistent
standards.
Additionally, courts employing the abuse of discretion standard
fail to further the policies of the Federal Rules' liberal pleading regime.' 3 6 If each district court judge applied Rule 11 consistently
with these policies, abuse of discretion review would be acceptable.
This, however, is not the case. A district court decision can be reasonable, and therefore non-reversible under the abuse of discretion
standard, but still apply Rule 11 overbroadly. Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 13 7 is an example of an overbroad but reasonable appliNote, supra note 8, at 638.
Nelken, supra note 5, at 1327.
132
See supra Part II for a description of the approaches of the courts of appeals.
133
See supra Parts iI(B) and (C).
134
See, e.g., S. KASS1N, supra note 105, at 29-32 (judges with different rationales have
different views of hypothetical cases).
135
For a demonstration and discussion of judges' inconsistent application of
Rule 11, see supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
i36 For a description of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's liberal pleading policies, see supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
137 596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Il. 1984), affd 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
13o
iS1
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cation of Rule 11. In Rodgers, the Northern District of Illinois found
the plaintiff's section 1983 claim to be sanctionable because most of
his "claims ha[d] no arguable basis in existing law." 13 8 This holding
overlooks Rule I I's allowance of "good faith arguments for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." 13 9 While some of
plaintiffs claims were clearly implausible and therefore sanctionable, others were not so clearly implausible. 14 0 However, the trial
judge was not unreasonable in sanctioning plaintiff's attorney; he
merely engaged in an overbroad reading of Rule 11.141 This case
demonstrates how chilling decisions may slip through under abuse
of discretion review.
Attorneys in those circuits employing abuse of discretion review
for "warranted by law" cases must face inconsistent and possibly
overbroad judicial application of Rule 11. One judge may find a
paper sanctionable which another judge finds permissible. With
only limited appellate court review to guide them, district court
judges are free to develop their own personal standards in line with
their differing views of Rule 11. Although one can argue that uncertainty serves the deterrence purposes of Rule 11,142 the price-dis138

139

Id. at 16-17.

Rule 11, supra note 1.
In Rodgers, Lincoln Towing Service towed plaintiff's car because it was illegally
parked in a private lot. Several days later, Chicago police questioned plaintiff without
having read him his rights, regarding a vandalism incident which Lincoln reported. The
police held plaintiff until 5 a.m. the next morning and did not let him post bail, although
he offered to do so. Rodgers, 596 F. Supp. at 16. Plaintiff's complaint alleged violations
of the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 15.
Some of these claims are clearly implausible. For example, it is difficult to imagine the
first amendment being implicated under these facts. However, other claims are more
plausible. The court rejected plaintiff's eighth amendment claim, stating that "[t]he
eighth amendment proscribes cruel and unusual punishment, excessive bail, and excessive fines. Nothing in the facts alleged fits within the ambit of the kind of conduct the
cases say is prohibited by this amendment." Id. at 17. However, this reasoning does not
address whether the denial of bail is a good faith argument for the extension or modification
of existing law. In addition, the court relied on a 5 to 4 Supreme Court decision, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), to add that because plaintiff had not been convicted, the cruel and unusual punishment clause would not apply. 596 F. Supp. at 17.
Considering that four Supreme Court justices adhere to plaintiff's view, surely it is a
good faith argument for a change in the law.
141
In attempting to define the term "abuse of discretion," Judge Friendly describes
the most deferential form of that standard as requiring the appellate court to ask if the
trial court was unreasonable, the moderate approach as requiring the appellate court to
ask if the trial court committed a clear error of judgment, and the least deferential approach as allowing the appellate court to reverse if it thinks the trial court made a mistake. Friendly, supra note 86, at 763-64. Thus, if the district judge in Rodgers were
unreasonable, the court of appeals would have reversed regardless of which form of
abuse of discretion review it used. Since it did not reverse, the Seventh Circuit must not
have considered the district court decision unreasonable.
142
See Note, supra note 112, for a discussion of deterrence as the primary purpose of
Rule 11. Uncertainty overdeters attorneys who see themselves as being particularly vulnerable to sanction. An uncertain risk of sanction may lead an attorney who can ill af140
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couraging attorneys from trying doctrine-challenging cases-is too
high to justify this means of accomplishing those goals.
b.

De Novo Review Is the Better Approach in "Warranted by
Law" Cases

Courts applying de novo review 143 to "warranted by law" cases
do so because they perceive the question as one of law.1 4 4 As the
Second Circuit stated in Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York,
"[w]here the only question on appeal becomes whether, in fact, a
pleading was groundless, [appellate courts] are in as good a position
14 5
to determine the answer [as trial courts]."
Greater appellate court involvement in this inquiry helps promote uniformity to the extent that the "warranted by law" decision
is taken out of the trial court's hands. No longer are there many
different voices in a circuit, each setting its own standards of legal
sufficiency. Instead, the discretion lies with the court of appeals,
whose decisions are binding on all of the district courts in the circuit. Thus, appellate courts create greater uniformity regarding issues upon which they have ruled by exercising their law declaration
power. 46 Such uniformity is especially important in "warranted by
law" cases, as the threat of a chilling effect is great. In a circuit
where the appellate court has taken an active role in the development of Rule 11 jurisprudence, the court supplies litigants with
bright line standards that provide notice and promote fairness and
efficiency.14 7 The uncertainty that contributes to the chilling effect
is diminished.
14 8
The Fifth Circuit, in Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc.,
raised the counter-argument that de novo review does not promote
uniformity any more than abuse of discretion review does because
"many sanctions cases are fact-intensive, close calls." 1 49 This argument, however, does not apply to the "warranted by law" inquiry.
Appellate courts can create general rules in "warranted by law"
cases that would channel trial courts' behavior, thus promoting uniford one to perceive a threat and steer clear of borderline, yet legitimate claims and
theories.
143
These courts include those which employ the three-tiered analysis, see infra Part
II(B), and those that adhere to the variation analysis. See supra Part II(C).
144
See, e.g., Westmoreland, Inc. v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
145
762 F.2d at 254 n.7.
146 See supra note 120 and accompanying text for a discussion of the law declaration
power of appellate courts.
147
See Note, supra note 112, at 912-13.
148
836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc). For a discussion of this case, see supra
notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
149
Id. at 873 (quoting ABA SANCTIONS, supra note 7, at 28-29.
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formity. For example, the Eastway150 court held that Rule 11 is violated "where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance
of success under the existing precedents, and where no reasonable
argument can be made to extend, modify, or reverse the law as it
stands .
*.".."151
Had the Seventh Circuit ruled similarly in Rodgers,1 5 2 it would have given the district courts a workable standard
for determining whether claims are "warranted by law."' 15 3 By providing such standards, appellate courts can promote uniformity in
legal sufficiency cases.
Because the American judicial system views appellate courts as
more qualified than district courts to decide questions of law, 15 4 one
may assume that their legal sufficiency decisions will effectuate more
closely the policies of the Federal Rules. Appellate courts can limit
overbroad application of Rule 11 in "warranted by law" cases by
reading Rule 11 so as not to conflict with the Federal Rules' liberal
pleading policies. Thus, de novo review of legal sufficiency cases
should further combat Rule lI's potential chilling effects.
2.

"Well-Grounded in Fact" Cases

Courts must impose a sanction if they find that an attorney or
pro se litigant has filed a paper that is not "well grounded in
fact."' 15 5 As with other Rule 11 issues, the courts of appeals have
developed two different standards of review. Courts that employ
the abuse of discretion standard and courts that employ the variation standard review factual sufficiency cases under an abuse of discretion standard. 156 Courts employing the three-tiered analysis
57
review these decisions do novo.1

150 Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985); see also
supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
151 Id. at 254.
152 Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985); see supra notes
137-41 and accompanying text for an analysis of Rodgers.
153
Such a standard would be binding on the district courts in the circuit. See supra
notes 123-26 and accompanying text for an analysis of the status of appellate courts in
the American judicial system.
154 See supra note 126 for a discussion of the reasons this is so.
155 Rule 11, supra note 1. It should be noted here that the trial court's findings of
fact are to be distinguished from its determination that the "well grounded in fact"
clause of Rule 11 has or has not been violated. The former refers to the facts or circumstances which gave rise to the Rule 11 controversy. The latter refers to the factual basis
of the litigant's papers.
156 See supra Parts II(A) and (C).
157 See supra Part II(B).
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a. Abuse of Discretion Review Is Ineffective in Combatting
Rule 11 "sPotential Chilling Effect in "Well Grounded in
Fact" Cases
Those courts that review factual sufficiency cases under an
abuse of discretion standard defer to the district court's familiarity
with "the flavor of the litigation."15 8 Such an approach does little to
counter the potential chilling effects of Rule 11. Courts choose the
abuse of discretion standard because they believe that "well
grounded in fact" decisions require a fact-intensive inquiry that is
best left to trial courts. 15 9 However, the factors that inform factual
sufficiency cases 160 are as available to reviewing courts as they are to
the trial court. The facts alleged in a pleading are a matter of record. The reviewing court easily can ascertain the circumstances surrounding the attorney's factual inquiry. For example, the appellate
court can determine whether an impending statute of limitations
deadline existed or whether defendant controlled all of the facts
supporting plaintiff's case. 16 1 This inquiry does not depend upon
the trial judge's observation of the development of the lawyer's behavior or the development of the litigation, as is the case with improper purpose sanctions.1 62 The factual sufficiency decision
depends only on whether the pleading was reasonably well
grounded in fact under the circumstances. 163 Thus, appellate courts
are qualified to make a de novo review.
b.

De Novo Review Is the Better Approach

There are, however, good reasons for appellate courts to
closely review factual sufficiency cases. As with legal sufficiency
cases, courts may interpret Rule 11 in "well grounded in fact" cases
in a way that conflicts with the liberal pleading policies of the Federal Rules. Courts also may apply the Rule inconsistently.' 6 4 By doSee, e.g., Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
159 See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc).
160
The Advisory Committee Note describes these factors as being the amount of
time available for investigation, whether the attorney had to rely on the client for the
facts, and whether the attorney depended on forwarding counsel or another member of
the bar. Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 199.
161
Although the Advisory Committee's concerns about satellite litigation, id. at 201,
may be a factor here, such a limited factual inquiry does not seem to create a danger of
"ancillary proceedings that may themselves assume the definition of litigation with a life
of its own." Schwarzer, supra note 31.
162
See infra Part IV(A)(3) for an analysis of appellate approaches to improper purpose cases.
163
See Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 199 for a description of what constitutes the
factual sufficiency inquiry; see also supra note 160.
164
For a description of overbroad and inconsistent applications of Rule 11 in the
factual sufficiency context, see supra notes 97, 99, and 101 and accompanying text.
158
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ing so, they may chill the enthusiasm of lawyers bringing
65
unorthodox or doctrine-challenging claims.'
By reviewing factual sufficiency decisions de novo, appellate
courts can prevent these problems. Courts should treat what is essentially a question of law as such. Appellate courts reviewing these
cases de novo will promote uniformity by promulgating general
rules to guide trial courts, thus ameliorating litigant uncertainty.
Additionally, appellate courts are expected to decide questions of
law "correctly," 6 6 in harmony with the liberal pleading standards of
the Federal Rules.' 6 7 By applying de novo review to "well
grounded in fact" decisions, courts of appeals merely fulfill their
role in the American system of judicial administration as the fora
168
which decide questions of law.
3.

Improper Purpose Cases

Courts must impose a sanction if a paper is "interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation." 169 Prevention of these
abuses is a laudable goal and this clause is probably the least contro70
versial and the least likely to cause an unacceptable chilling effect.'
The courts of appeals have adopted two standards for reviewing
Rule 11 decisions based on the improper purpose clause. Courts
using the abuse of discretion standard and the variation standard
conduct abuse of discretion review. 17 1 Those using the three-tiered
172
analysis review these cases de novo.
The improper purpose clause "requires that the court attempt
to fathom the motives of the signer."'" Because this is a subjective
determination, it calls for a different inquiry than the other grounds
for imposing a sanction. In this case, the inquiry must focus on the
signer's behavior, rather than on the paper itself, because a signer's
motive is best ascertained by observing his behavior over the course
165
For an analysis of Rule I l's potential chilling effect in factual sufficiency cases,
see supra notes 99 and 101 and accompanying text.
166
For an analysis of this proposition, see supra notes 123-26 and accompanying
text.
167
See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text for a description of the Federal
Rules' liberal pleading standards.
168
Louis, supra note 120, at 994 ("[L]aw declaration is the special province of the
appellate level.").
169 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983).
170
See Note, supra note 8, at 642-43 (the improper purpose clause is less troublesome than the others because it focuses on lawyer behavior rather than product).
171 See supra Part II(A) and (C).
172 See supra Part II(B).
173 Nelken, supra note 5, at 1320.
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of the litigation.1 74
a. Appellate Courts Should Defer to the District Court's Decision in
"Improper Purpose" Cases
Because the improper purpose ruling often depends on information obtained apart from the record-from having observed the
proceedings-the trial judge is in the best position to make this determination. He has "tasted the flavor of the litigation" 17 5 and has a
"better grasp of what is acceptable trial-level practice among litigating members of the bar than [do] appellate judges."' 17 6 Improper
purpose cases, unlike legal sufficiency and factual sufficiency cases,
fit the "fact-intensive inquiry" paradigm relied on by the Thomas
court. 177 Consequently, appellate courts should defer to district
court "improper purpose" findings and employ abuse of discretion
review.
The term "abuse of discretion," however, "is a verbal coat of
...many colors,"' 178 and is an incomplete description of what the
appellate court actually does when it applies this standard. Courts
employing an abuse of discretion standard may grant "almost unreviewable discretionary power" to trial courts in some cases,179
"much narrower discretionary power" in others, 8 0 and there are
8l
numerous variations between the extremes.'
Because appellate courts defer broadly to trial courts 8 2 in finding the facts of a case, Judge Friendly suggests that "[o]ne test for
determining the amount of deference that should be accorded to
rulings of trial courts .. . is how closely the trial court's superior
opportunities to reach a correct result approximate those existing in
its determinations of fact."' 8 3 A trial court's superior opportunities
to reach a correct result in its determinations of facts arise from its
direct contact with the witnesses.'8 4 Similarly, the trial court's superior opportunities to reach a correct result in the "improper pur174 See Note, supra note 8, at 642.
175 Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985).176 Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(quoting Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 566 (E.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 762 F.2d 243 (1985)).
177

Id.

178

Friendly, supra note 86, at 763 (paraphrasingJustice Frankfurter, United States v.

L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 39 (1952) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting)).
179 Louis, supra note 120, at 1039.
180 Id.
181
Friendly, supra note 86, at 763.

182

For a discussion of the reasons underlying this deference, see id. at 759.

183
184

Id. at 760.
Id. at 759.
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pose" context arise from its insight into the signer's motive gained
from having observed the litigation.
The potential chilling effect in the improper purpose context is
limited,18 5 and the trial court is better suited to make the determination. Thus, there is little to be gained by appellate court scrutiny of
"improper purpose" cases.
4.

The District Court's Choice of Sanction

The Advisory Committee Note interprets Rule 11 to give discretion to the trial court "to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of
the case" so that it "retains the necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule."' 1 6 While the Advisory Committee states deterrence as the primary purpose of Rule 11,187 judges
have different conceptions. Some believe that compensation is the
primary purpose; others believe that punishment is.188 A study has
shown that a judge's view of the Rule's primary purpose may influence her determination of which sanction to impose.18 9 Thus, similarly situated litigants may be treated differently, and this disparity
violates the basic tenet of justice and fairness. 190
Nevertheless, the flexibility the Advisory Committee views
Rule 11 as affording district court judges in fashioning appropriate
sanctions makes Rule 11 a potentially effective case management
tool. The trial judge has observed the attorney throughout the litigation and can best gauge which sanction will best serve Rule lI's
purpose.
In view of this, the courts of appeals all agree that the standard
of review to apply for "sanctions imposed" cases is abuse of discretion.' 9 1 This is the best approach. As in the "improper purpose"
inquiry, the trial court's observation of the litigation plays an important role in its decision here. The appellate court would be less able
to make an informed judgment as to how best to deter the offending
attorney because it must rely on the record alone. Additionally, as
explained below, appellate courts can combat the potential chilling
185 But see Note, supra note 8, at 642-43 (arguing that improper purpose cases give
rise to a chilling effect if courts infer an improper purpose from the poor quality of the
lawyer's product).
186 Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 200.
187 Id. at 198-200.
188 See S. KASSIN, supra note 105, at 29-32. Ofjudges asked about Rule lI's primary
purpose, 59.4% said deterrence, 21% compensation, and 19.6% punishment.
189 Id. at 32. Kassin's study indicated that compensation-oriented judges may grant
higher awards than punishment-oriented judges, with deterrence-oriented judges in between. However, Kassin warns that the study does not settle the issue because the group
tested was too small. Id. at 30 n.63.
190 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
191 See supra Part II.
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effect of an extreme sanction without engaging in broad review and
undermining the district court's flexibility. Thus, appellate courts
should continue to apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the district court's choice of sanction.
The question of how broadly appellate courts should read the
abuse of discretion standard suggests itself. The choice of sanction
issue is a "situation where there are strong reasons to defer to the
trial court's judgment, [and yet,] substantial benefits from the development of generally applicable rules" are possible." 1 9 2 Appellate
courts should provide guidance as to the purpose of Rule 11,193
which in turn would indicate that some sanctions are more appropriate than others.' 9 4 This guidance would give "direction to lower
courts and promote uniformity"' 19 5 without intruding too much on
the benefits to be derived from allowing the trial court to exercise its
discretion. Judge Friendly recommends "a principle of preference:
The district judge shall, or shall not, do thus and so, unless he finds
that course inappropriate."'' 96 In a Rule 11 case, the appellate court
might say, for example, that "the purpose of Rule 11 is deterrence.
Therefore, the district judge shall not use fee shifting as her formula
for computing sanctions, unless she deems it appropriate. In making this determination, the district judge shall consider the degree
of subjective bad faith present in the signer."' 97 In this way, the
district judge has both the freedom to tailor the sanction and guidance as to the factors to consider in making this determination.
This type of limited review will preserve district court flexibility and
also decrease the chilling effect that can arise from the district
court's choice of sanction.
5.

Findings of Fact

Appellate courts should review the trial court's determination
of the facts used to establish whether Rule 11 was violated under a
clearly erroneous standard. Rule 52(a) 19 8 dictates this standard,
providing that "[f]indings of fact ... shall not be set aside unless
Friendly, supra note 86, at 768.
For a discussion of Rule I l's primary purpose of deterrence and of the relationship between that purpose and the sanction chosen, see Note, supra note 112.
194
For an analysis of what sanction is appropriate in various circumstances, see id. at
917-20.
195
Friendly, supra note 86, at 769.
196 Id. at 768.
197
For a more comprehensive analysis of this approach, see Advisory Note, supra
note 6, at 198; see also Friendly, supra note 86, at 767-71. Subjective bad faith in the
signer, while no longer necessary to impose a sanction, is recommended by the Advisory
Committee as a factor to be considered in deciding "the nature and severity of the sanctions to be imposed." Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 200.
198
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
192

193
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clearly erroneous" in cases where the trial judge was the fact
finder.' 9 9 There is some debate as to whether a Rule 11 decision
must in all cases be supported by findings of fact. 20 0 While an indepth analysis of this issue is beyond the purview of this Note, it
seems reasonable that, at least in some cases, findings should be
required. 20 ' Although one must consider the Advisory Committee's
legitimate concerns regarding satellite litigation 2 02 and should note
that Rule 52(a) does not require findings of fact for most motions, 20 3 "[a] serious Rule 11 motion is not a gnat to be brushed off
20 4
with the back of the hand."
CONCLUSION

The courts of appeals have not taken a leading role in combatting the dangers of district courts' inconsistent and overbroad application of Rule 11. Although Rule 11 is fundamentally a case
management tool, there are several issues that not only allow for,
but also require appellate court scrutiny. In the American system of
judicial administration, appellate courts are equipped with the
power to refine and correct trial courts' legal decisions. By deferring to the district courts regarding some or all Rule 11 issues, the
appellate courts abdicate this responsibility. On the other hand, because some Rule 11 issues are best left to the trial court's discretion,
appellate courts can do more harm than good by being overly intrusive regarding them.
Because Rule 11 decisions require several inquiries that, in
turn, call for differing degrees of appellate scrutiny, appellate courts
must analyze these cases on an issue by issue basis. The appellate
courts should review de novo the district court's legal conclusion
that a paper was grounded in fact or grounded in law. In this way,
the reviewing courts can contribute to the goal of uniformity and
combat the potential chilling effect of inconsistent and overbroad
application of Rule 11. The district court's findings of fact should
be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. The reviewing
court should play a more subdued role regarding improper purpose
199
200

Id.
See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 882-83 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc);

Schwarzer, supra note 31, at 199.
201
In fact, several circuits do require findings under certain circumstances. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Federation of State Medical Boards of United States, 830 F.2d 1429, 1438 (7th
Cir. 1987) (district court judges shall "state with some specificity the reasons for the
sanctions."); Thomas, 836 F.2d at 882 n.23 (findings mandated when prepayment of
sanctions award has effect of significantly precluding access to courts.).
202 See Advisory Note, supra note 6, at 201.
203
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
204
Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1084 (7th Cir. 1987).
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findings, given the importance of trial court observation of litigation
behavior to making this finding. Finally, the courts of appeals
should allow the trial court to retain its flexibility in choosing the
appropriate sanction, but at the same time, should provide guidance.
ChristopherA. Considine

